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The authors propose that volitional action is supported by intuitive affect regulation, defined as flexible,
efficient, and nonrepressive control of own affective states. Intuitive affect regulation should be most
apparent among action-oriented individuals under demanding conditions. Consistent with this, a de-
manding context led action-oriented individuals to down-regulate negative affect in self-reports (Study
1), in an affective Simon task (Study 2), and in a face discrimination task (Study 3). In line with the idea
that intuitive affect regulation is guided by top-down self-regulation processes, intuitive affect regula-
tion in a face discrimination task was mediated by increases in self-accessibility (Study 3). No parallel
effects emerged among action-oriented participants in a nondemanding context or among state-oriented
participants.
People’s feelings, their greatest passions and their deepest fears,
are essential guides to behavior. As volumes of psychological
research have testified, feelings prepare people to respond quickly
and adaptively to potential risks and opportunities in their envi-
ronment (Frijda, 1986). Moreover, a life without feelings would be
dull beyond imagination, lacking the spice that imbues people’s
experiences with meaning and significance. Even so, when nothing
keeps people’s feelings in check, people risk becoming “hijacked”
by their own emotions (Goleman, 1995; Kuhl, 1981). During an
emotional hijacking, even the slightest setback may set off an
immobilizing depression and the remotest fear can turn into over-
whelming anxiety, just as a trivial irritation may trigger a raging
bout of anger. To prevent such emotional hijackings, people need
to actively regulate their own affective states, making sure that
their feelings are appropriate to circumstance (Gross, 1999).
In the present article, we further elaborate on the link between
affect regulation and volitional action control. On the basis of a
recent theory of volition (Kuhl, 2000; Kuhl & Koole, 2004), we
suggest that volitional action control is supported by intuitive
affect regulation, a form of affect regulation in which high-level
executive systems are closely coordinated with implicit affective
processes. Consequently, individuals who are highly action ori-
ented are likely to be especially skilled at intuitive affect regula-
tion. By contrast, individuals who are low on action orienta-
tion—or state-oriented individuals—may be lacking in intuitive
affect regulation skills. In the following paragraphs, we begin by
reviewing the existing literature on volition and affect regulation.
After this, we present three empirical studies that tested our the-
oretical analysis.
Volition and Affect Regulation
The road from wishes to action is often long and filled with
many obstacles (Heckhausen & Kuhl, 1985). Indeed, modern
theories of volition suggest that people must rely on specialized
psychological mechanisms to ensure that their wishes and goals
are translated into concrete actions (Gollwitzer, 1996; Kuhl, 1984,
2000). The strength of these volitional mechanisms is demon-
strated by the fact that people can be highly persistent in their goal
strivings, even in the face of considerable difficulties and repeated
setbacks (Klinger, 1975; Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1982). Of par-
ticular interest, people who are actively engaged in their goal
pursuits manage to maintain a highly optimistic outlook on life,
and display greater levels of emotional well-being than less active
people (Kasser & Sheldon, 2004; Taylor & Gollwitzer, 1995). In
light of these considerations, it seems plausible that volitional
functioning is supported by a set of powerful affect regulation
mechanisms. Aided by these affect regulation mechanisms, people
may shield themselves against the aversive affect that arises as a
result of demoralizing circumstances.
Prior research on affect regulation processes has primarily stud-
ied either deliberate affect regulation, such as suppression (Gross
& John, 2003), or automatic affect regulation, such as repression
(Langens & Mo¨rth, 2003). Both deliberative and automatic affect
regulation exert important influences on people’s emotional lives.
Nevertheless, the two types of affect regulation have only limited
utility in volitional functioning. Deliberative affect regulation is
closely connected with logical–analytic thinking and can thus be
flexibly attuned to people’s goals. However, deliberative affect
regulation is also relatively slow and effortful. Because many
action contexts are cognitively taxing and unpredictable, deliber-
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ative affect regulation is frequently incapable of supporting voli-
tional action control. Automatic affect regulation, on the other
hand, is relatively fast and efficient. However, automatic affect
regulation is performed by low-level perceptual functions that are
largely insensitive to the symbolic meanings of people’s actions
(Greenwald, 1988). Accordingly, automatic affect regulation is too
rigid to be brought in line with people’s higher order goals.
Moreover, volitional functioning often necessitates the confronta-
tion with aversive affect (e.g., taking steps to convert a threat into
an opportunity), which renders immediate avoidance strategies
inadequate.
In many demanding or threatening circumstances, neither delib-
erative nor automatic affect may be sufficient for attaining voli-
tional action control. What additional processes might then be
implicated? Recently, this issue has been addressed by personality
systems interactions (PSI) theory (Kuhl, 2000; Kuhl & Koole,
2004). According to PSI theory, volitional functioning is facili-
tated by intuitive affect regulation processes. Intuitive affect reg-
ulation is defined as an implicit form of affect regulation that is
nonetheless under the control of central executive (i.e., volitional)
mechanisms. Intuitive affect regulation shares characteristics with
both deliberative and automatic affect regulation processes. In
terms of its efficiency, intuitive affect regulation is similar to
automatic affect regulation. In being flexibly attuned to people’s
ongoing goal pursuits, intuitive affect regulation is similar to
deliberative affect regulation. However, unlike automatic or delib-
erative affect regulation, intuitive affect regulation is controlled
neither by low-level reflexes nor by explicit intentions. Accord-
ingly, intuitive affect regulation represents a qualitatively distinct
form of affect regulation.
The functional basis for intuitive affect regulation is provided by
extension memory. Extension memory is a hypothetical construct
specific to PSI theory that refers to a central executive system that
supports an intelligent form of intuition (Baumann & Kuhl, 2002).
The workings of extension memory are largely implicit, because
the system functions are presumably carried out by parallel-
distributed processors that are capable of handling vast amounts of
complex information at speeds that greatly exceed the capacity of
the conscious mind. Extension memory thus builds on the kinds of
processes specified by parallel-distributed processing models
(Read, Vanman, & Miller, 1997; Rumelhart, McClelland, & the
PDP Research Group, 1986). Extension memory is conceived of as
an implicit representational system that provides integrated knowl-
edge about the self and the environment. This knowledge base
includes extended networks of relevant semantic meanings; remote
action alternatives; and self-aspects, including the person’s needs,
motives, and autobiographical experiences. Because extension
memory promotes integrative cognitive activity, activation of ex-
tension memory will facilitate autonomous functioning. The con-
cept of extension memory thus provides a functional explanation
for complex motivational phenomena such as authenticity and free
will (Koole & Kuhl, 2003; Kuhl & Koole, 2004).
According to PSI theory, extension memory can acquire affect
regulation functions when the system develops connections with
lower level affective systems (Kuhl, 2000). This assumption is
consistent with evidence for the importance of interconnectivity
between neocortical regions and limbic networks for the regulation
of action (Chambers, Taylor, & Potenza, 2003; Mayberg et al.,
1999; Tucker et al., 2003). Once appropriate corticolimbic con-
nections have been established, extension memory can regulate the
person’s affective states in a highly efficient manner. For instance,
when external performance pressures give rise to feelings of ten-
sion, extension memory may use its connections with the affect
systems to activate relaxing feelings. Because of extension mem-
ory’s vast integrative powers, intuitive affect regulation has no
need to rely on suppression or avoidance mechanisms. Instead,
intuitive affect regulation functions like an “inner democracy” that
considers many “voices” (e.g., gut reactions, needs, motives, con-
textual constraints, and abstract goals) in controlling the person’s
affective states.
Intuitive Affect Regulation and Action Orientation
Intuitive affect regulation skills may be acquired as a result of
people’s social interaction experiences (Kuhl, 2000; for empirical
evidence, see Kopp, 1989; Schore, 1994; Schulte, Hartung, &
Wilke, 1997). When the social environment is autonomy support-
ive, extension memory is able to develop strong connections with
the affective systems. By contrast, when the social environment is
hostile, indifferent, or controlling, extension memory becomes
inhibited and thus less able to connect with the affective systems.
Given the natural variation in social environments, individual
differences in intuitive affect regulation skills are likely to arise.
Although intuitive affect regulation skills are largely inaccessi-
ble to introspection, people may learn about their intuitive affect
regulation skills indirectly by observing the consequences that
these skills have for their volitional goal pursuits (Kuhl & Koole,
2004). Individuals with strong intuitive affect regulation skills are
able to pursue their goals in a highly efficient, unhesitating man-
ner, even under highly stressful circumstances. Accordingly,
strong intuitive affect regulation skills should go hand in hand with
an action-oriented style of self-regulation. By contrast, individuals
with weak intuitive affect regulation skills are vulnerable to un-
controllable ruminations and hesitation, especially under stressful
circumstances. Weak intuitive affect regulation skills should thus
be associated with a state-oriented style of self-regulation. On the
basis of this conceptualization, Kuhl (1981, 1994) has developed a
self-report scale for assessing variations in action versus state
orientation.
Action orientation is defined as a metastatic mode of control, in
which the enactment of change-oriented intentions is facilitated
(Kuhl, 1984). By contrast, state orientation is defined as a cata-
static model of control, which preserves the status quo by inhib-
iting the enactment of change-oriented intentions (Kuhl, 1984). A
schematic model of action orientation and intuitive affect regula-
tion is shown in Figure 1. We provide this model to organize our
hypotheses, not because we aim to test it in its entirety. According
to the model, action orientation regulates how people cope with
their initial affective responses. Under stressful conditions, action-
oriented individuals mobilize central executive systems (i.e., ex-
tension memory) and engage in implicit down-regulation of neg-
ative affect. To the extent that this down-regulation is successful,
action-oriented individuals will display mood improvements and
facilitated self-regulation under stressful conditions. By contrast,
state-oriented individuals under stressful conditions either refrain
from affect regulation or engage in relatively ineffective forms of
affect regulation. Consequently, state-oriented individuals will re-
spond to stressful conditions with persistent negative affect, neg-
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ative rumination, and inhibited self-regulation. Notably, the afore-
mentioned differences between action- versus state-oriented
individuals should only emerge under stress. Under relaxing con-
ditions, state-oriented individuals may even display better moods
and self-regulation than action-oriented individuals (Koole, Kuhl,
Jostmann, & Vohs, in press).
To date, more than 40 published studies have supported the
validity of the action orientation construct (for reviews, see Dief-
endorff, Hall, Lord, & Strean, 2000; Koole et al., in press; Kuhl &
Beckmann, 1994). In an early study among hospitalized patients,
action-oriented patients reported less subjective pain, lower use of
painkillers, and reduced fear compared with state-oriented patients
after surgery (Kuhl, 1983). A subsequent prospective study found
that stressful life events had a more adverse impact on depression
among state-oriented individuals than among action-oriented indi-
viduals (Rholes, Michas, & Shroff, 1989). Experimental research
has similarly supported a link between action orientation and
powerful affect regulation skills. Brunstein and Olbrich (1985)
showed that repeated failure inductions led state-oriented partici-
pants to report more negative affect and self-blame. By contrast,
the same repeated failures caused action-oriented participants to
engage in motivating self-instructions and reaffirmations of their
sense of personal mastery. In a related vein, Heckhausen and
Strang (1988) found that performance pressure led to reliable
increases in physiological arousal and lower performance among
state-oriented athletes. Action-oriented athletes, however, main-
tained constant levels of physiological arousal and performance
even under high performance pressure. The finding that action
orientation has reliable physiological effects is remarkable, given
that automatic and deliberative affect regulation tend to have little
impact on physiological functioning (Gross, 1998; Paulhus,
Fridhandler, & Hayes, 1997).
More recently, research has explored the role of extension
memory in intuitive affect regulation. Baumann and Kuhl (2003)
showed that action-oriented individuals are more capable of judg-
ing their own emotional preferences than state-oriented individu-
als, especially under high negative affect (see also Kaze´n, Bau-
mann, & Kuhl, 2003; Kuhl & Kaze´n, 1994). Because extension
memory is presumed to underlie people’s emotional preferences,
these findings support the notion that action-oriented individuals
access extension memory in coping with negative affect. This
conclusion was further supported by Baumann and Kuhl (2002),
who found that action-oriented individuals are better able to pro-
vide complex intuitive judgments than state-oriented individuals.
Again, the effects of action orientation emerged only when nega-
tive affect was high, suggesting that complex intuition among
action-oriented individuals is closely associated with affect-
regulation functions.
The Present Research and Hypotheses
We designed the present research to further examine the link
between action orientation and intuitive affect regulation. In three
studies, we primed a demanding versus a nondemanding context
Figure 1. Model of action orientation and intuitive affect regulation.
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among action- versus state-oriented participants. In Studies 1 and
2, we primed varying levels of demand by manipulating perfor-
mance-contingent rewards (Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999); in
Study 3, we used a visualization procedure to prime a demanding
versus an accepting relationship context (Baldwin & Sinclair,
1996). Study 1 focused on subjective mood changes, whereas
Studies 2 and 3 examined two different indicators of implicit
affective processing. In addition, Study 3 tested the mediating role
of extension memory in intuitive affect regulation. Across all three
studies, our general hypothesis was that priming a demanding
context would trigger intuitive affect regulation among action-
oriented participants but not among state-oriented participants.
According to PSI theory, important differences exist between
demand-related action orientation (AOD) and threat-related action
orientation (AOT; Kuhl, 2000).1 AOD relates to the self-regulation
of behavior (the “how” of action). Under demanding conditions,
people are confronted with multiple goals that cannot be per-
formed at once. Coping with demand thus involves the coordina-
tion between planning and behavioral output systems. AOD is
most likely to develop when the social environment encourages the
person to cope with stress by taking behavioral initiatives. AOT
relates to the self-regulation of meaningful experience (the “why”
of action). Under threatening conditions, people are confronted
with negative or unexpected information that undermines their
ability to make sense of the situation. Coping with threat thus
involves the coordination between perceptual and high-level cog-
nitive systems. AOT is most likely to develop when the social
environment encourages the person to cope with stress by engag-
ing in meaningful self-expressions, which allow for negative ex-
periences to become integrated into the self. Given that the present
research used manipulations of demand, we expected to find
primarily effects of AOD in the present research.
Study 1
Study 1 examined the effects of action orientation and perfor-
mance-contingent rewards on subjective mood changes. Past re-
search has found that a consistent buildup of implicit affective
reactions can have significant effects on subjective mood (Char-
trand, Bargh, & Van Baaren, 2002). Consequently, if intuitive
affect regulation mechanisms are sufficiently strong and consis-
tent, they might become translated into subjective mood improve-
ments. Previous investigations have indeed found effects of action
orientation on subjective mood (Kuhl, 1983; Rholes et al., 1989).
However, this research either examined mood changes over rela-
tively long periods of time (i.e., days or weeks) or did not use
standardized mood rating scales (Brunstein & Olbrich, 1985).
Study 1 complemented and extended these studies by examining
the effects of action orientation on moment-to-moment changes in
subjective mood as rated on standardized and validated scales.
More specifically, participants reported their moods at the begin-
ning of the experimental session, immediately after a demand
induction, and 10 min after the induction.
Theoretically, intuitive affect regulation processes should follow
a rather specific time course. PSI theory argues that deliberative,
explicit processing tends to inhibit extension memory (Kuhl,
2000). Thus, intuitive affect regulation may not emerge immedi-
ately after the demand induction, when the induction is still likely
to be held in explicit awareness. Some time after the demand
induction, however, the demand induction would be more likely to
become processed on more implicit levels. From that moment on,
intuitive affect regulation processes should begin to take effect.
Consistent with this, prior research has shown that the effects of
action orientation are often most pronounced after a time delay
(Brunstein, 1989; Kaze´n et al., 2003).
On the basis of the foregoing considerations, we predicted that
action-oriented participants would mainly display mood improve-
ments 10 min after the demand induction. Among state-oriented
participants, we predicted no delayed mood improvements under
high demand, in view of these individuals’ lack of intuitive affect
regulation skills. Under low demand, however, we did expect
state-oriented individuals to display significant mood improve-
ments. This prediction was based on observations that state-
oriented individuals are usually able to benefit from a supportive
environment. Indeed, research suggests that state-oriented individ-
uals benefit even more from emotional support than action-
oriented individuals (cf. Nolen-Hoeksema & Davis, 1999). Ac-
cordingly, down-regulation of negative affect in response to a
nondemanding context was not expected to occur to the same
degree among action-oriented individuals.
To induce a demanding context, we manipulated performance-
contingent rewards, a well-studied type of external demand that is
important in many real-life contexts (Deci et al., 1999).
Performance-contingent rewards provide an incentive for meeting
a set criterion, norm, or level of competence (Ryan, Mims, &
Koestner, 1983). People may experience the reception of perfor-
mance-contingent rewards as positive, because such rewards con-
vey that the recipient is skillful or competent at the activity.
However, performance-contingent rewards also have a controlling
aspect, because they pressure people toward specified outcomes.
Indeed, research has shown that performance-contingent rewards
can give rise to feelings of tension (Ryan et al., 1983). If reward-
induced tension is not kept under control, it can lead to “choking”
effects (Baumeister & Showers, 1986; Heckhausen & Strang,
1988). Consequently, we predicted that action-oriented individuals
in Study 1 would down-regulate their tension levels in response to
performance-contingent rewards.
Besides tension levels, we also assessed changes in participants’
level of depression, anger, fatigue, and vigor. However, because
our reward manipulation was mainly relevant to the regulation of
tension (Ryan et al., 1983), we did not expect action orientation to
affect these other types of mood. We thus predicted that the effects
of action orientation in response to performance-contingent re-
wards would be specific to participants’ tense moods.
Method
Participants and Design
Eighty-two paid volunteers at the Free University Amsterdam (34 men
and 48 women, average age 21 years) participated in the experiment. The
1 Kuhl (1994) introduced the labels “failure-related” and “decision-
related” action orientation to what the present research refers to as “threat-
related” and “demand-related” action orientation, respectively. This depar-
ture from the previous terminology is preferred because the latter terms are
more directly related to relevant constructs within PSI theory (e.g., Kuhl,
2000).
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experimental design consisted of a 2 (AOD: action vs. state; between
participants)  2 (reward type: performance contingent vs. noncontingent;
between participants)  3 (mood assessment: before, immediately after, or
10 min after the reward manipulation; within participants) design. The
main dependent variable consisted of participants’ feelings of tension.
Procedure
On arrival in the laboratory, participants were led to individual cubicles,
each containing an Apple Macintosh (iMac) computer. The experimenter
explained that the remaining instructions would be administered via a
computer program, and left. Participants were first informed by the pro-
gram that the investigation would consist of a number of unrelated studies,
which were supposedly administered together for efficiency reasons. Par-
ticipants then moved to the first study, which contained our assessment of
individual differences. After this, participants rated their feelings on a
series of mood adjectives. Participants then moved on to the next study,
which consisted of the manipulation of performance pressure. Immediately
afterward, participants rated their feelings for a second time. Next, partic-
ipants proceeded with some filler tasks that together lasted about 10 min.
Following this filler task, participants rated their moods for a third time.
Subsequently, participants were probed on their beliefs regarding the
purpose of the experiment, answered some manipulation check questions,
and were asked to supply some biographical information. Finally, partic-
ipants were thanked for their efforts, debriefed, and paid by the
experimenter.
Independent Variables
Individual differences. To assess individual differences in action ori-
entation, we used a Dutch translation of the Action Control Scale (ACS-90;
see the Appendix for sample items). The ACS-90 has been developed and
extensively validated by Kuhl and others (for reviews, see Diefendorff et
al., 2000; Kuhl & Beckmann, 1994; Kuhl & Koole, 2004). We adminis-
tered two 12-item subscales of the ACS-90, which measured AOD and
AOT. AOD and AOT have empirically emerged as separate dimensions in
factor-analytic studies (e.g., Diefendorff et al., 2000). Furthermore, condi-
tions that involve only high demand or high threat can selectively trigger
AOD and AOT, respectively (for a review, see Koole et al., in press).
Effects of action orientation have been found across a wide range of
different measures and domains, including intention memory, physiologi-
cal arousal, medicine intake, therapeutic outcomes, athletic performance,
and work psychology. Action orientation thus appears to be a global
construct that operates over and above domain-specific processes. More-
over, research has established that the effects of action orientation are not
due to self-efficacy or control expectations (Kuhl, 1981), achievement
motivation (Heckhausen & Strang, 1988), neuroticism (Baumann & Kuhl,
2002), extraversion (Koole, 2004b), self-esteem (Koole, 2004c), or con-
scious emotion-regulation strategies (Koole, 2004c) and occur over and
above the effects of the Big Five personality dimensions (Diefendorff et al.,
2000).
AOD and AOT items were intermingled and presented in a different
random order for each participant. Each of the items of the ACS-90
describes a stressful situation and an action- versus state-oriented way of
coping with the situation. For each item, participants were asked to select
the response that best described their own reaction to the situation. Nota-
bly, the ACS-90 does not ask participants to provide introspective judg-
ments of their volitional abilities but rather asks participants to report on
the consequences that these volitional abilities have for their behavior.
Action-oriented choices were coded as 1 and state-oriented choices were
coded as 0 and summed for the entire subscale. Participants who made
seven or more action-oriented choices on AOD were assigned to the
action-oriented group; participants who made six or fewer action-oriented
choices were assigned to the state-oriented group.2 The same procedure
was followed for the AOT scale.
Our assessment also included Dutch translations of the Rosenberg Self-
Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965) and the Emotion Regulation Question-
naire (Gross & John, 2003). One subscale of the Emotion Regulation
Questionnaire measures chronic reliance on cognitive reappraisal strategies
to regulate one’s emotions (six items); a second subscale measures chronic
reliance on emotional suppression strategies (four items). Respective Cron-
bach’s alphas for AOD, AOT, self-esteem, reappraisal, and suppression
were .79, .80, .89, .87, and .76.
Reward manipulation. After the individual differences assessment,
participants were asked to solve a number of arithmetic sums. During each
sum, participants were to add up three one- or two-digit numbers and type
in the correct response. Participants first practiced solving one sum and
were then given 2.5 min to complete as many sums as possible. During the
entire task, the remaining time was visually displayed on the computer
screen by means of a small alarm clock on the computer screen. After 2.5
min had passed, participants received feedback regarding the number of
sums that they had solved correctly. Following this feedback, the reward
manipulation was introduced.
Participants in the performance-contingent reward condition were in-
formed that there would be a second block of arithmetic sums. It was
stressed that the level of difficulty and the amount of time for the second
block of sums would be identical to the first block. However, this time,
participants would be able to earn a bonus. If participants succeeded in
solving at least 10% more sums than during the first block, they would earn
a bonus of €1.00. (Note that at the time of the study, €1.00  approxi-
mately US$1.00.) If participants succeeded in solving at least 25% more
sums than during the first block, they would earn a bonus of €2.50.
Participants were further told that the second block of arithmetic sums
would be preceded by a few unrelated studies, allegedly “to avoid fatigue.”
These “unrelated studies” contained the second and third administrations of
the Profile of Mood States (POMS), separated by a filler task of about 10
min. Participants in the noncontingent reward condition were informed that
they had solved more sums than the average participant within the same
amount of time. Accordingly, they were given an extra bonus of €2.50. The
positive feedback and unexpected bonus were meant to induce a positive,
rewarding context and to allow the overall financial compensation for the
arithmetic task to be equal across experimental conditions. Research indi-
cates that unexpected rewards of this kind are generally not experienced as
controlling (Ryan & Deci, 2000). To ensure that participants were not
provided with an uncompleted intention, no mention was made of a second
block of sums in the noncontingent reward condition (Kuhl & Helle, 1986).
Mood assessment. During the three consecutive mood assessments,
participants rated their feelings on 32 mood adjectives that were drawn
from the shortened version of the POMS (Shacham, 1983) and translated
into Dutch (Van den Berg, Koole, & Van der Wulp, 2003). The 32 mood
2 In Studies 1–3, we always performed the median split at the conceptual
midpoint of the AOD and AOT scales. The conceptual midpoint of these
scales was also found to be empirical midpoint in Studies 1–3, and it was
the normative midpoint in a large-scale study among Dutch university
students (N  1,457; cf. Koole, 2003). We further examined our data in
Studies 2 and 3 using a regression approach (this approach was not feasible
in Study 1, which had a three-level within-participants variable). The
results showed that the critical AOD  Reward Type interaction on the
affective Simon effect for negative target words in Study 2 was significant,
  .25, t(53)  2.07, p  .05. In Study 3, the AOD  Visualization
interaction was similarly significant on happy among angry faces pop-out
(HAFPO; see Study 3),   .25, t(67)  2.19, p  .04, and on speed of
self-evaluation,   .25, t(67)  1.99, p  .05. Thus, a regression
approach yielded results equivalent to the analysis of variance (ANOVA)
approach. Because a regression approach made it impossible to inspect the
absolute means in Studies 2 and 3, we report the ANOVA results in the
main body of this article.
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items formed five subscales, which assessed feelings of depression (un-
happy, sad, blue, hopeless, discouraged, miserable, helpless, worthless),
anger (angry, peeved, annoyed, resentful, bitter, furious), fatigue (ex-
hausted, tired, worn out, spent, dead-beat, washed out), vigor (lively,
active, energetic, cheerful, full of pep, vigorous), and tension (tense, on
edge, uneasy, restless, nervous, anxious). Respective Cronbach’s alphas for
these POMS scales were .91, .83, .90, .84, and .85 during the first
assessment; .96, .84, .92, .76, and .83 during the second assessment; and
.95, .86, .92, .86, and .85 during the third assessment.
Results
Mood Ratings
Participants’ average tension ratings were subjected to a 2
(AOD)  2 (reward type)  3 (time of measurement) ANOVA
with repeated measures on the last factor. This analysis yielded a
main effect of AOD, F(1, 78)  9.81, p  .003, which indicated
that overall, action-oriented participants experienced less tension
than state-oriented participants (M  1.34 vs. M  1.73). The
analysis also revealed an effect of time, F(2, 77) 3.05, p .053,
indicating that on average, participants experienced more tension
at the time of the first mood measurement (M  1.59) than during
the second and third mood measurements (Ms  1.52 and 1.49,
respectively). Finally, the analysis produced the predicted three-
way interaction between AOD, reward type, and time, F(2, 77) 
3.56, p  .04. Relevant means are displayed in Table 1.
To further unpack this three-way interaction, we examined our
results separately for action- and state-oriented participants.
Among state-oriented participants, the analysis revealed a mar-
ginal two-way interaction between reward type and time, F(2,
37)  3.08, p  .058. In the noncontingent reward condition,
state-oriented participants experienced a decrease in tension im-
mediately after the manipulation, F(1, 21)  4.85, p  .04 (MTime 1
 1.97 vs. MTime 2  1.74). This decrease was still marginally
reliable 10 min after the introduction of noncontingent rewards,
F(1, 21)  3.24, p  .086 (MTime 1  1.97 vs. MTime 3  1.77).
In the performance-contingent reward condition, state-oriented
participants displayed no reliable changes in tension (Fs  2,
ps  .10).
Among action-oriented participants, the analysis revealed a
main effect of time, which indicated that action-oriented partici-
pants on average experienced less tension with each mood mea-
surement, F(2, 39) 4.68, p .02 (MTime 1 1.39 vs.MTime 2
1.33 vs. MTime 3  1.28). In addition, the analysis yielded the
predicted two-way interaction between reward type and time, F(2,
39)  3.56, p  .04. In the noncontingent reward condition,
action-oriented participants experienced no reliable changes in
tension (Fs  1). By contrast, in the contingent reward condition,
action-oriented participants showed highly reliable changes in
tension between the different mood measurements, F(2, 44) 
5.64, p  .008. Immediately after the introduction of contingent
reward, action-oriented participants experienced no meaningful
changes in tension, F(1, 22)  1.22, p  .281 (MTime 1  1.43 vs.
MTime 2  1.36). However, some 10 min later, action-oriented
participants in the contingent reward condition experienced a
significant drop in tension, F(1, 22)  6.89, p  .02 (MTime 2 
1.36 vs. MTime 3  1.25).
Average depression, anger, and fatigue ratings failed to yield
any effects of AOD. This pattern was as anticipated, given that the
manipulation of performance-contingent rewards was mainly rel-
evant to the regulation of tense mood.
Supplementary Analyses
AOD was positively correlated with AOT, r(82)  .51; self-
esteem, r(82)  .53; and reappraisal, r(82)  .33 (all ps  .003).
No relation between AOD and suppression was found, r(82) .04,
p  .71. AOT, self-esteem, reappraisal, or suppression did not
yield effects comparable to those obtained for AOD.
Discussion
The results of Study 1 confirmed that action- versus state-
oriented individuals have strikingly different mood dynamics un-
der varying levels of demand. In response to perfor-
mance-contingent rewards, action-oriented participants displayed
significant down-regulation of tense mood. This down-regulation
was not so much apparent immediately after the reward induction
but rather when moods were assessed 10 min afterward. No similar
drops in tension were found among action-oriented participants in
response to noncontingent rewards. This pattern supports PSI
theory, which argues that the intuitive affect regulation strategies
of action-oriented individuals are characterized by efficient down-
regulation of negative affect, which grows stronger over time.
As expected, state-oriented participants showed no evidence of
down-regulation of tension in response to performance-contingent
rewards. However, state-oriented participants did show down-
regulation of tension in response to noncontingent rewards. This
pattern fits with Kuhl’s (2000) suggestion that state-oriented indi-
viduals may reap substantial emotional benefits from a supportive
environment. This type of externally supported affect regulation
does not depend so much on the person’s own inner resources and,
consequently, should be a more immediate function of the envi-
ronment. In line with this, noncontingent rewards led to immediate
down-regulation of tension among state-oriented participants. No-
tably, state-oriented participants were able to maintain this mood
benefit at least for another 10 min. This pattern suggests that once
state-oriented individuals are induced to feel better, these individ-
uals are capable of holding on to their improved moods. State-
oriented individuals’ maintenance of positive affect may be ex-
Table 1
Average Tension Ratings as a Function of AOD, Reward Type,
and Time (Study 1)
Reward type
State orientation Action orientation
Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 Time 1 Time 2 Time 3
Noncontingent
M 1.97 1.74 1.77 1.34 1.30 1.32
SD 0.67 0.58 0.76 0.56 0.55 0.55
Contingent
M 1.61 1.68 1.65 1.43 1.36 1.25
SD 0.74 0.74 0.73 0.59 0.42 0.40
Note. Tension scores ranged from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very much). AOD
demand-related action orientation; Time 1  before the reward type
manipulation; Time 2  immediately after the reward type manipulation;
Time 3  10 min after the reward type manipulation.
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plained by either passive affective priming processes (Fazio, 2001)
or by more active positive ruminations (Oettingen & Mayer,
2002).
Finally, a noteworthy finding in Study 1 is that performance-
contingent rewards produced no increases in tension among either
state- or action-oriented participants, even though the same ma-
nipulation reliably induced down-regulation of tension among
action-oriented participants. Given the explicit nature of the ten-
sion measurement, it is conceivable that participants were unwill-
ing or unable to report increases in tension (Nisbett & Wilson,
1977). A further possibility is suggested by Ryan et al. (1983), who
argued that the effects of performance-contingent rewards are
motivationally complex because they combine controlling aspects
with a positive informational value (i.e., they communicate one’s
level of competence). Accordingly, the positive informational
value of performance-contingent rewards may have compensated
the controlling aspect of performance-contingent rewards in par-
ticipants’ subjective experience. On a more implicit level, how-
ever, the controlling aspect of performance-contingent rewards
was still processed by action-oriented participants, resulting in
down-regulation of tension within this group. Taken together,
these various considerations suggest that intuitive affect regulation
may be particularly apparent on implicit levels. We further exam-
ined this notion in Studies 2 and 3.
Study 2
Recent research on implicit affective processes has led to the
development of some powerful new paradigms for investigating
implicit affective processes (Fazio, 2001; Greenwald & Banaji,
1995). In Studies 2 and 3, we adapted some of these paradigms to
the study of intuitive affect regulation. Because we were mainly
interested in the down-regulation stage of intuitive affect regula-
tion, we administered a brief filler task after the stress induction in
Studies 2 and 3. After this filler task, action-oriented participants
were presumably ready to move beyond the confrontation stage.
In Study 2, we used the affective Simon task (De Houwer &
Eelen, 1998) to study intuitive affect regulation. In this task,
participants are asked to provide a positive or negative response to
a target stimulus on the basis of a nonaffective stimulus feature
(the relevant stimulus feature). For instance, participants might be
required to say “positive” when a target stimulus is an adjective
and “negative” when the target stimulus is a noun. In judging a
nonaffective feature of a target stimulus (such as grammatical
status), the affective meaning of the presented stimulus is objec-
tively irrelevant. Even so, participants find the task easier (as
indicated by faster response times and lower error rates) when
there is a match between the valence of the response and the
(irrelevant) valence of the stimulus. For instance, participants find
it easier to say “positive” to positively valenced words and “neg-
ative” to negatively valenced words than to say “positive” to
negatively valenced words and “negative” to positively valenced
words. This affective matching phenomenon has become known as
the affective Simon effect (De Houwer & Eelen, 1998).
The affective Simon effect represents an instance of uninten-
tional affective processing, because the effect occurs when the
affective meanings of the target words are objectively irrelevant.
Indeed, the affective Simon effect occurs even when participants
are explicitly instructed to ignore the affective meanings of the
target stimuli (De Houwer & Eelen, 1998). In addition, the affec-
tive Simon effect qualifies as an instance of efficient affective
processing, because the effect occurs despite the fact that partici-
pants are simultaneously engaged in another resource-demanding
task (e.g., judging the grammatical category of target words).
Finally, because the task-irrelevant valence and the relevant fea-
ture are aspects of the same target stimulus in the affective Simon
task, they have an onset asynchrony of 0 ms. Therefore, the
observation of affective Simon effects is indicative of fast affective
processing. Thus, the affective Simon task provides a suitable
paradigm to study intuitive affect regulation.
To establish a demanding context in Study 2, we used the same
manipulation of performance-contingent rewards as in Study 1.
Because Study 1 showed that this manipulation primarily involves
regulation of negative affect (i.e., tension), participants’ responses
to negatively valenced words were of primary interest to us. In
response to performance-contingent rewards, action-oriented indi-
viduals were presumed to activate implicit volitional mechanisms
that facilitate rapid and efficient switching from negative toward
positive affect. Consequently, we expected that saying “positive”
to negative targets would become facilitated for action-oriented
individuals in the performance-contingent reward condition. Con-
versely, performance-contingent rewards might cause action-
oriented individuals to inhibit negative affect, making it more
difficult for them to activate negative responses. As a result, saying
“negative” to negative targets might become more difficult for
action-oriented individuals in the contingent rewards condition.
Thus, we predicted that performance-contingent rewards would
lead to attenuation or perhaps even a reversal of affective Simon
effects for negative target words among action-oriented
participants.
We predicted no moderation of affective Simon effects among
action-oriented participants in response to noncontingent rewards,
because action-oriented participants were not expected to activate
their intuitive affect regulation skills in a low-demanding context.
Finally, none of the aforementioned effects were predicted for
state-oriented participants, because state-oriented individuals pre-
sumably do not possess strong intuitive affect regulation skills.
Method
Participants and Design
Sixty paid volunteers at the Free University Amsterdam (31 men and 29
women, average age 20 years) participated in the experiment. The exper-
imental design was 2 (AOD: state vs. action)  2 (reward type: contingent
vs. noncontingent) between participants. The main dependent variable
consisted of participants’ responses in the affective Simon task.
Procedure
The equipment, measurement of individual differences, and reward
manipulation were identical to Study 1. Respective Cronbach’s alphas of
AOD, self-esteem, reappraisal, and suppression were .69, .85, .71, and .79.
The alpha of AOT was .46, which is below conventional standards. This
probably was a chance finding, because the same AOT scale had accept-
able reliabilities in Studies 1 and 3 and in previous research using this scale
(see Koole et al., in press). After the manipulation of reward type, partic-
ipants completed a filler task that lasted approximately 5 min. Participants
then continued with the affective Simon task. Next, participants completed
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a second block of arithmetic sums3 as part of the reward manipulation and
were asked to state why they would receive an extra bonus. All but 3
participants were able to answer this question correctly. The latter 3
participants (5% of the sample) were removed from the data set. Finally,
participants were paid, debriefed, and thanked for their participation.
Affective Simon Task
The affective Simon task, adapted from De Houwer and Eelen (1998),
was described to the participants as “a study on grammar.” The computer
presented a number of consecutive words on the screen, which consisted of
various nouns and adjectives. Participants were to decide as quickly as
possible whether the words were adjectives or nouns. If the word on the
screen was an adjective, participants were to say the word positive and
press the “A” key on the keyboard.4 If the word on the screen was a noun,
participants were to say the word negative and press the “6” key on the
numeric pad of the keyboard. The assignment of response valences to the
two grammatical categories was not counterbalanced, because past re-
search has shown that affective Simon effects occur irrespective of the
particular combination between grammatical category and response va-
lence (De Houwer & Eelen, 1998).
To promote quick responding, participants were instructed to place their
fingers on the appropriate response keys during the actual task. As in De
Houwer and Eelen (1998), participants were explicitly instructed to ignore
the affective meaning of the target words. Notably, the meaning of a word
does not have to be processed in order to determine its grammatical status
(Roelofs, 1992). For instance, a simple nonsemantic strategy is to assess
whether an article such as the or a could be placed in front of the presented
word in a sensible way. The latter strategy was explicitly pointed out to the
participants. Before starting with the actual task, participants completed 10
test trials. During these test trials, the computer provided feedback regard-
ing the accuracy of participants’ responses. After this, participants pro-
ceeded with the actual task.
The affective Simon task began with 4 warm-up trials that were followed
by 24 experimental trials. The experimental target words were presented in
separate trials that were run in a different random order for each partici-
pant. Each trial consisted of the following sequence of events: a fixation
asterisk (1,000 ms), a blank screen (500 ms), and a target word that
remained on the screen until participants pressed a response key. The
computer unobtrusively recorded participants’ response latencies and key
presses. All visual stimuli (the fixation asterisk and target words) were
presented in the center of the computer screen. The next trial was initiated
2 s after participants had pressed a response key. During half of the
experimental trials, adjectives were presented as targets; the other half of
the trials had nouns as targets. In addition, half of the target words had a
positive meaning, and half of the target words had a negative meaning. The
target words were all intrinsically social (e.g., friendly, lonely, hate, re-
ward), because PSI theory assumes that intuitive affect regulation is
socially conditioned (Kuhl, 2000).
Results
Response Latencies
Before analyzing the response latency data, we removed erro-
neous responses and response latencies that were longer than 3,000
ms from the data set. In line with the affective Simon effect,
participants’ responses were generally quicker when target valence
and response valence were congruent than when target valence and
response valence were incongruent, F(1, 56)  17.36, p  .001
(M 1,179 vs.M 1,289). (All reported means are milliseconds.)
Given the specificity of our hypotheses, we proceeded by analyz-
ing the effects of action orientation and performance pressure
separately by negative and positive target valence.
Negative target words. Average response latencies for nega-
tive social target words were subjected to a 2 (AOD)  2 (reward
type)  2 (response valence) ANOVA. The analysis revealed a
two-way interaction between AOD and response valence, F(1,
53)  7.77, p  .008, and the predicted three-way interaction
between AOD, reward type, and response valence, F(1, 53) 
4.85, p  .04. Relevant means are displayed in Table 2.
To facilitate the interpretation of this three-way interaction, we
computed difference scores by subtracting average response laten-
cies for saying “negative” to negative target words from average
response latencies for saying “positive” to negative target words.
The resulting scores can be interpreted as an index of implicit
negative affect, that is, an affective Simon effect for negative
target words. A 2 (AOD)  2 (reward type) ANOVA revealed a
main effect of AOD, F(1, 53)  7.77, p  .008. On average,
action-oriented participants displayed weaker affective Simon ef-
fects for negative target words than state-oriented participants
(M 47 vs.M 247). However, this main effect was qualified by
the predicted two-way interaction between AOD and reward type,
F(1, 53)  4.85, p  .04. In the noncontingent reward condition,
action- and state-oriented participants had similar affective Simon
effects for negative target words (F  1). In the performance-
contingent reward condition, however, action-oriented participants
had much smaller affective Simon effects for negative target words
than state-oriented participants, F(1, 53)  12.91, p  .002 (M 
48 vs. M  303). Notably, action-oriented participants in the
contingent reward condition displayed a (nonsignificant) reversal
of the affective Simon effect for negative target words (F 1). By
contrast, the three other groups of participants displayed signifi-
cant affective Simon effects for negative target words (all Fs  5,
all ps  .05).
Positive target words. A parallel 2 (AOD)  2 (reward
type)  2 (response valence) ANOVA was run for positive target
3 In Study 2, we also assessed and analyzed the number of correct
solutions that participants had provided during the second block of arith-
metic sums. To correct for differences in arithmetic ability, we subtracted
performance during the first block from performance during the second
block. Average increases in number of solved sums were subjected to a 2
(action orientation: action vs. state)  2 (reward type: contingent vs.
noncontingent) between-participants ANOVA. The analysis yielded a sig-
nificant interaction between action orientation and reward type, F(1, 53) 
9.61, p .004. Action-oriented participants displayed a smaller increase in
the number of solved sums when rewards were performance contingent
than when they were noncontingent, F(1, 53)  6.20, p  .02 (M  1.50
vs.M 4.39). By contrast, state-oriented participants showed a marginally
significant larger increase in the number of solved sums when rewards
were performance contingent than when they were performance noncon-
tingent, F(1, 53)  3.60, p  .063 (M  3.75 vs. M  1.56). Presumably,
the higher performance among state-oriented participants in response to
performance-contingent rewards is reflective of these individuals’ procliv-
ity to identify themselves with unattractive tasks, especially under high
negative affect (Baumann & Kuhl, 2003; Kaze´n et al., 2003).
4 In the original De Houwer and Eelen (1998) paradigm, responses were
assessed using a voice key. However, subsequent research has shown that
affective Simon-type effects may also be obtained with button-pressing
responses (De Houwer, 2003). Moreover, the affective Simon effects
obtained in Study 2 could only have resulted from the overlap between the
(objectively irrelevant) affective valence of the response and the valence of
the target words (J. De Houwer, personal communication, April 29, 2003).
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words. In line with the affective Simon effect, the analysis yielded
an effect of response valence, F(1, 53) 2.91, p .05, one-tailed.
Participants were on average slower to respond “negative” than
“positive” to positive target words (M 1,349 vs.M 1,203). No
significant effects emerged involving AOD or reward type (all
ps  .10).
Error Rates
As with the response latency data, we first determined whether
participants’ average error rates showed an affective Simon effect.
In line with the affective Simon effect, participants’ error rates
were generally lower when target valence and response valence
were congruent than when target valence and response valence
were incongruent, F(1, 56) 5.84, p .02 (M .09 vs.M .14).
We computed participants’ error rates by dividing their number of
errors by the total number of responses. The analysis of error rates
for negative target words revealed the predicted three-way inter-
action between AOD, reward type, and response valence, F(1,
53)  5.14, p  .03. The analysis of error rates for positive target
words again yielded no parallel effects.
Looking at the differences in error rates between saying “posi-
tive” versus saying “negative” to negative target words (i.e., the
affective Simon effect for negative target words), AOD had no
effect in the noncontingent reward condition (F  1; M  .09 vs.
M  .04). In the contingent reward condition, however, action-
oriented participants had significantly lower affective Simon ef-
fects for negative target words than state-oriented participants,
F(1, 53)  6.97, p  .02 (M  .05 vs. M  .18). Stated
differently, state-oriented participants displayed a nonsignificant
increase in affective Simon effects for negative target words due to
contingent rewards, F(1, 53)  1.99, p  .16 (M  .04 vs. M 
.18). By contrast, action-oriented participants displayed a margin-
ally significant decrease in affective Simon effects for negative
target words due to noncontingent rewards, F(1, 53)  3.03, p 
.088 (M  .09 vs. M  .05).
Supplementary Analyses
AOD correlated positively with AOT, r(57)  .30, p  .03, and
self-esteem, r(57) .30, p .03, and negatively with suppression,
r(57).28, p .04, and was uncorrelated with reappraisal (r
.12, ns). As in Study 1, the analysis revealed no effects of AOT,
self-esteem, suppression, or reappraisal that paralleled the effects
of AOD.
Discussion
Study 2 confirmed that action orientation, in conjunction with
reward type, was a strong moderator of affective Simon effects to
negative target words. In the noncontingent reward condition, the
response latencies of both action- and state-oriented individuals
displayed a Simon effect for negative target words. Thus, both
action- and state-oriented participants showed evidence of unin-
tentional, efficient, and fast activation of negative affect in the
absence of external stressors. However, this pattern was dramati-
cally different in the contingent reward condition. In response to
performance-contingent rewards, the response latencies of state-
oriented participants still displayed a Simon effect for negative
target words. The response latencies of action-oriented partici-
pants, however, showed a nonsignificant reversal of the affective
Simon effect: In response to performance-contingent rewards,
action-oriented participants were nonsignificantly quicker in say-
ing “positive” than in saying “negative” to negative target words.
A very similar pattern was obtained for error rates, attesting to the
robustness of our findings. Notably, Study 2 again found only
effects of AOD and no effects of AOT, in line with the notion that
demanding conditions selectively trigger effects of AOD.
There is a notable difference between the effects of noncontin-
gent rewards on state-oriented participants in Studies 1 and 2. In
Study 1, state-oriented participants who had received noncontin-
gent rewards displayed significant decreases in negative affect
(i.e., tension). In Study 2, state-oriented participants who had
received noncontingent rewards displayed automatic activation of
negative affect, albeit to a lesser degree than state-oriented partic-
ipants who had received performance-contingent rewards. This
discrepancy may be explained by the different nature of the affect
measures in Studies 1 and 2. In Study 1, negative affect was
assessed via self-report, whereas in Study 2, negative affect was
assessed via the affective Simon task. Self-reports of tension might
easily be affected through passive priming mechanisms, such as
the increased accessibility of an unexpected reward. By contrast,
reduction of negative affect in the affective Simon task requires
active cognitive control, given that the task itself automatically
cues negative affect. Thus, the positive effects of noncontingent
rewards on state-oriented participants may be primarily mediated
by passive affective priming mechanisms.
Study 3
In Study 3, we sought to replicate and extend the findings of
Study 2 in three ways. First, we used a visualization task rather
than performance-contingent rewards to induce high levels of
demand. The validity of the visualization paradigm has been
established in prior research on interpersonal relations (Baldwin &
Sinclair, 1996). The underlying idea is that visualizing past rela-
tionship experiences implicitly activates the interaction patterns
and psychological responses that individuals experienced within a
specific relationship context. We assumed that visualizing a de-
manding relationship would prime a host of unfulfilled goals,
Table 2
Average Response Latencies (in Milliseconds) for Negative
Target Words as a Function of Reward Type, AOD, and
Response Valence (Study 2)
AOD
Noncontingent reward Contingent reward
Positive
response
valence
Negative
response
valence ASE
Positive
response
valence
Negative
response
valence ASE
Action
M 1,475 1,310 164 1,232 1,280 48
SD 477 386 258 329 299 252
State
M 1,340 1,135 205 1,379 1,076 303
SD 418 327 281 309 217 260
Note. AOD demand-related action orientation; ASE affective Simon
effect (in milliseconds).
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expectations, and other regulatory standards (Shah, Kruglanski, &
Friedman, 2003), thereby invoking a psychological context of high
demand. Similar to the performance-contingent rewards in Studies
1 and 2, a demanding relationship also involves a controlling
aspect in that demanding relationship partners pressure people
toward particular behaviors.
Second, we used a nonverbal paradigm to assess intuitive affect
regulation: the affective processing of facial stimuli. The human
face is an exceptionally powerful affect-eliciting stimulus (Zajonc,
1998). Of particular interest is evidence that human responses to
threatening faces are mediated by specialized neural circuitry
(Morris, O¨ hman, & Dolan, 1998) that largely operates on noncon-
scious levels. Our measure of intuitive affect regulation was based
on work by O¨ hman, Lundqvist, and Esteves (2001). In this para-
digm, participants are asked to identify a face with a discrepant
emotional expression among a crowd of otherwise identical faces.
Detecting a happy target face among an angry crowd requires
participants to switch their attention from a negative affective
context (an angry crowd) toward a positive affective stimulus (a
happy face). This attentional switching might be facilitated by
intuitive affect regulation processes. In particular, intuitive affect
regulation may enhance the efficiency with which individuals are
able to detect a happy target face among a crowd of angry dis-
tractor faces. We thus predicted that action-oriented participants
under high demand would display a recognition advantage for
happy faces that were embedded in crowds of angry faces.
Besides providing a nonverbal measure of intuitive affect reg-
ulation, the face discrimination task affords a test of the nonre-
pressiveness of intuitive affect regulation. Past research on face
detection has found evidence for a recognition advantage of dis-
crepant angry faces, which are detected more efficiently than
discrepant happy or neutral faces (O¨ hman et al., 2001). The latter
effect has been interpreted in terms of automatic vigilance for
negative affect. Because automatic vigilance is presumably medi-
ated by bottom-up visual attention mechanisms, it is functionally
distinct from intuitive affect regulation (which relates to top-down
attention control). We therefore hypothesized that the recognition
advantage of angry target faces would emerge in action-oriented
participants independently of any recognition advantage of happy
target faces among angry crowds. Past research has indicated that
repression does interfere with automatic vigilance for negative
affect (Langens & Mo¨rth, 2003). Consequently, finding a dissoci-
ation between intuitive affect regulation and automatic vigilance
for negative affect would further support the distinction between
intuitive affect regulation and repression.
Third and last, Study 3 sought to test a potential mediator of
intuitive affect regulation. According to PSI theory, intuitive affect
regulation skills are controlled by extension memory (Baumann &
Kuhl, 2002). Extension memory has a number of cognitive signa-
tures, including facilitation of complex coherence judgments (Bau-
mann & Kuhl, 2002), access to emotional preferences (Kuhl &
Kaze´n, 1994), and autonomous implicit self-evaluations (Koole,
2004c). In the present research, however, we focused on extension
memory’s significance for accessing self-knowledge. PSI theory
argues that one important indicator for the activation of extension
memory is the efficiency with which individuals are able to access
self-knowledge (Koole & Kuhl, 2003).5 This variable can be
operationalized as speed of responding in a me/not-me self-
evaluation task. Self-evaluation in this type of task involves cor-
ticolimbic processing (Tucker et al., 2003). In addition, speed at
self-evaluation has been related to intuitive self-knowledge
(Koole, Dijksterhuis, & Van Knippenberg, 2001) and the posses-
sion of clear and certain self-knowledge (McGregor & Marigold,
2003). Accordingly, speed at self-evaluation provides a valid
marker of extension memory activation.
We predicted that the demanding visualization would lead to
faster self-evaluations among action-oriented participants, an ef-
fect that was not predicted for state-oriented participants. This
self-activation effect was expected to occur for both negative and
positive self-evaluations because PSI theory assumes that exten-
sion memory contains both positive and negative self-
representations. Extension memory activation thus should be dis-
tinguished from self-enhancement processes (Sedikides & Strube,
1997). Finally, we hypothesized that increases in self-activation
would mediate intuitive affect regulation among action-oriented
participants in the face discrimination task.
Method
Participants and Design
Seventy-one paid volunteers at the Free University Amsterdam (37 men
and 34 women, average age 21 years) participated in the experiment. The
experimental design was 2 (AOD: state vs. action)  2 (visualization:
demanding vs. accepting) between participants. The main dependent vari-
able consisted of participants’ response latencies in detecting smiling faces
embedded in matrices of angry faces.
Procedure
The equipment and first part of the procedure were similar to that of
Study 1. Participants first answered a few questionnaires assessing indi-
vidual differences in action AOD, AOT, and self-esteem (respective alphas
were .70, .76, and .87). Participants then moved on to a visualization
exercise that contained the demand priming manipulation. Next, partici-
pants proceeded with a filler task of about 3 min followed by a self-
evaluation task, which was designed to assess momentary variations in
self-accessibility. After completion of the self-evaluation task, participants
went on with the face discrimination task. Before the end of the experi-
ment, participants answered some manipulation check questions and were
probed on their beliefs regarding the purpose of the experiment.
Visualization Manipulation
The visualization was closely modeled on prior research (Baldwin &
Sinclair, 1996). The procedure was described to the participants as a
“visualization exercise” during which they were requested to visualize a
particular person from their own life. Participants in the demanding visu-
alization condition were asked to think of a person who was highly
demanding of them and to type in this person’s initials. These initials were
5 The astute reader may wonder whether the predicted self-activation
effect should not occur for AOT, given our earlier argument that AOT is
relevant to self-expression. However, the self-accessibility measure in
Study 3 is conceptually related to the certainty with which self-evaluations
are held (Campbell, 1990). Self-certainty maps onto the executive func-
tions of the self, because the possession of certain self-knowledge helps
guide people toward a clear course of action in conflicted situations
(McGregor & Marigold, 2003). AOT is theoretically related to the struc-
tural variables of self that are indicative of deep cognitive elaboration, such
as self-complexity (Linville, 1985).
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used throughout the visualization exercise in referring to the visualization
target. Subsequent instructions encouraged participants to vividly imagine
being with this person and to reexperience their thoughts and feelings
associated with this person. At various stages during the visualization
exercise, participants were asked to type in the experiences that were
aroused by the visualization. To bolster the credibility of the cover story,
participants rated their ease of visualization at the end of the exercise.
Participants in the accepting visualization condition went through the same
procedure, but were asked instead to visualize a person who was highly
accepting of them.
Dependent Measures
Face discrimination task. Participants were shown a series of matrices
that were composed of nine schematic faces that were taken from O¨ hman
et al. (2001). The size of each individual face was 3.5  4.0 cm. Each set
of nine faces was arranged in a 3  3 matrix. Half of the matrices were
composed of faces that all had the same emotional expression (i.e., happy,
angry, or neutral). In the other matrices, one target face had a different
emotional expression from that of the background distractors. The target
could occur at any of nine positions in the matrix. Thus, there were 54
different matrices containing a target. In addition, there were 3 different
distractor matrices without targets (happy, angry, or neutral), each of which
was shown 18 times to create an equal number of distractor matrices. The
instructions explained to the participants that their task was to detect
discrepant faces among the crowds of distractor faces that appeared on the
computer screen. Participants responded by pushing either a “one face is
different” or an “all faces are the same” button on the keyboard and were
asked to keep their hands near the buttons throughout the task. The
matrices always appeared on the center of the screen and remained on
screen until participants pressed one of the response keys. After making a
response, the screen went blank for 1.5 s before the next matrix appeared.
With 54 target matrices and 54 distractors, each participant was exposed to
108 randomly ordered matrices.
Self-evaluation task. The self-evaluation task was based on Koole et al.
(2001). Participants were informed that a number of trait words would be
presented individually on the computer screen. Participants were to decide
as quickly as possible whether they themselves possessed the trait or not by
pushing either a “me” or a “not me” button on the keyboard. The self-
evaluation task consisted of 30 trials. In 15 trials, the target trait was
positive (e.g., creative, reliable), whereas in the remaining 15 trials, the
target trait was mildly negative (e.g., silent, impulsive). To maximize
variability in endorsements of these traits, we chose positive and negative
traits that characterize most people some of the time. The presentation
order of the items was randomized for each participant. The computer
unobtrusively recorded each response (i.e., applies to me or not) and the
corresponding latency of each response.
Results
Manipulation Check
At the end of the experimental session, participants rated how
demanding and how accepting the person was whom they had
visualized (1  not at all, 9  very much). These items were
scored in the same direction and averaged (Cronbach’s   .63).
The person who was visualized in the demanding condition was
perceived as much more demanding than the person who was
visualized in the accepting condition, F(1, 67)  42.42, p  .001
(M  4.41 vs. M  2.61). No effects of AOD were found on this
index.
Face Discrimination Latencies
Given our hypotheses, we only discuss the results for the re-
sponses to crowds that contained a discrepant target face.6 Nota-
bly, our results did not change when we statistically controlled for
responses to crowds that contained only distractor faces. Before
analyzing participants’ response latencies in the face discrimina-
tion task, we first removed outliers (responses  3,000 ms) and
erroneous responses from the data set. After this, we computed
participants’ average latencies for responding to happy, angry, and
neutral target faces in crowds with a different facial expression.
Happy among angry pop-out. Our primary interest was in
participants’ average latencies for detecting happy target faces
among angry distractor crowds. To ensure that the results were
specific to switches from negative toward positive affect, we
controlled for participants’ average latencies for detecting happy
target faces among neutral distractor crowds. Accordingly, we
subjected participants’ average response latencies for detecting
happy target faces to a 2 (AOD: action vs. state)  2 (visualiza-
tion: demanding vs. accepting)  2 (distractor faces: angry vs.
neutral) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor. Rel-
evant means are displayed in Table 3. The analysis yielded a
highly significant effect of distractor faces, F(1, 67) 174.72, p
.001, which indicated that happy target faces were detected more
quickly when they were placed among neutral distractor faces than
when they were placed among angry distractor faces (M  1,167
vs. M  1,499). In addition, the analysis revealed a marginal
two-way interaction between visualization and context, F(1, 67)
3.49, p  .066, and the predicted three-way interaction between
AOD, visualization, and context, F(1, 67)  4.61, p  .04.
To facilitate the interpretation of the obtained three-way inter-
action, we computed difference scores by subtracting participants’
average response latencies for detecting happy target faces among
neutral distractor faces from participants’ average response laten-
cies for detecting happy target faces among angry crowds. The
resulting scores can be interpreted as an index of happy among
6 Analysis of participants’ average latencies of responding to crowds
with only angry, happy, or neutral distractor faces revealed that responses
to angry crowds were on average slower than responses to happy and
neutral crowds (M  1,877 vs. M  1,620). Although unanticipated, this
effect is consistent with the perseverating, attention-holding qualities of
negative affect (Fiske, 1980). Van der Wulp and Semin (2004) suggested
that negative affect has perseverating effects when the context is predom-
inantly negative (as is the case for all-angry crowds). Consistent with this
interpretation, a 2 (action orientation) 2 (visualization target) 2 (facial
expression) ANOVA yielded a three-way interaction between action ori-
entation, visualization target, and facial expression, F(1, 67)  4.84, p 
.04. To interpret this effect, we subtracted average response latencies for
happy and neutral faces from average response latencies for angry faces.
The resulting scores can be interpreted as an index of the attention-holding
qualities of angry faces. State-oriented participants were slower to respond
to all-angry crowds when they had visualized a demanding target than
when they had visualized an accepting target (M  302 vs. M  216). By
contrast, action-oriented participants were quicker to respond to all-angry
crowds when they had visualized a demanding target than when they had
visualized an accepting target (M  213 vs. M  334). Thus, visualizing
a demanding relationship increased perseveration of negative affect among
state-oriented participants and decreased perseveration of negative affect
among action-oriented participants.
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angry faces pop-out (HAFPO), with lower values indicating rela-
tively greater speed of detecting happy target faces among angry
crowds. Among action-oriented participants, visualizing a de-
manding relationship led to a faster HAFPO as compared with
visualizing an accepting relationship, F(1, 67)  8.26, p  .006
(M  220 vs. M  425). Among state-oriented participants, there
was a nonsignificant trend in the opposite direction (F  1; M 
362 vs. M  347). Another way of interpreting this interaction is
to note that there was no difference in HAFPO after participants
had visualized an accepting relationship (F 1). After participants
had visualized a demanding relationship, however, action-oriented
participants had a significantly faster HAFPO than state-oriented
participants, F(1, 67)  4.46, p  .04.
Angry faces pop-out. We further examined whether we repli-
cated the recognition advantage of angry target faces (O¨ hman et
al., 2001). Accordingly, we conducted an analysis on response
latencies for angry, happy, and neutral target faces, with facial
expression as a three-level within-subjects variable. Note that this
analysis aggregated the results across different distractor crowds.
Because the aggregated analysis revealed no effects of AOD and
visualization, these factors were dropped from the analysis. The
analysis revealed a highly significant effect of facial expression,
F(2, 69)  15.38, p  .001. Specifically, happy target faces were
detected more quickly than neutral target faces, F(1, 70)  17.63,
p  .001 (M  1,333 vs. M  1,420). Angry target faces, in turn,
were detected more quickly than happy target faces, F(1, 70) 
4.24, p  .001 (M  1,299 vs. M  1,333). Thus, we replicated
automatic vigilance for angry faces.
Self-Evaluation Latencies
To remove statistical outliers, response latencies longer than
3,000 ms were excluded from the analyses. Preliminary analyses
revealed that similar findings were obtained regardless of whether
participants had endorsed the traits or not. In addition, similar
findings were found for positive and negative traits. Accordingly,
self-evaluation latencies were aggregated across endorsed versus
nonendorsed and positive versus negative traits (Cronbach’s  
.81). We then subjected participants’ self-evaluation latencies to a
2 (AOD: action vs. state)  2 (visualization: demanding vs.
accepting) between-participants ANOVA. This analysis yielded
the predicted two-way interaction between action orientation and
visualization target, F(1, 67)  5.11, p  .03. As can be seen in
Table 4, action-oriented participants evaluated themselves more
quickly after they had visualized a demanding relationship com-
pared with when they had visualized an accepting relationship,
F(1, 32)  5.10, p  .04 (M  1,271 vs. M  1,533). By contrast,
state-oriented participants evaluated themselves nonsignificantly
more slowly after they had visualized a demanding relationship
compared with when they had visualized an accepting relationship,
F(1, 35)  1 (M  1,405 vs. M  1,356). It is important to note
that the obtained effects on self-evaluation latencies remained
significant when we statistically controlled for participants’ trait
endorsements in the self-evaluation task.7
Mediation Analysis
We have established that demand priming led to self-activation
(i.e., greater speed of self-evaluation) and intuitive affect regula-
tion (i.e., HAFPO) among action-oriented participants. Were these
patterns mutually related to each other? To examine this issue, we
conducted a series of path analyses to establish mediation (Kenny,
Kashy, & Bolger, 1998). In the analysis, we focused only on
action-oriented participants, given that state-oriented participants
showed no effects of demand priming on either self-activation or
intuitive affect regulation. To increase the sensitivity of the medi-
ation analysis, we used response latencies for happy faces among
neutral crowds as a covariate in predicting response latencies for
happy faces among angry crowds rather than using difference
scores. The relevant relationships can be seen in Figure 2. The
direct relationship between demand level and intuitive affect reg-
ulation was significant,  .35, t(32) 2.79, p .01. In addition,
demand level was predictive of self-activation,   .37, t(32) 
2.26, p  .04. Finally, when intuitive affect regulation was re-
gressed on demand and self-activation, self-activation had a sig-
nificant effect,   .43, t(32)  2.73, p  .02, and the effect of
demand became smaller and marginally significant,   .22,
t(32)  1.81, p  .080. According to the Sobel test for mediation,
this mediation effect was significant (Z  1.92, p  .04, one-
tailed). Note that a one-tailed Sobel test was appropriate because
the direction of the mediation effect was predicted a priori. More-
over, the Sobel test provides a rather conservative estimate of the
size of a mediation effect when the mediator is measured with less
than perfect reliability (Kenny et al., 1998).
7 We also examined whether action orientation and visualization influ-
enced the contents of participants’ self-evaluations. This analysis revealed
no effects on participants’ endorsement of positive self-evaluations. For
negative self-evaluations, the analysis revealed a main effect of action
orientation, F(1, 67)  3.94, p  .051, and a marginal interaction between
action orientation and visualization, F(1, 67)  3.46, p  .067. State-
oriented participants endorsed more negative traits after they had visual-
ized a demanding relationship than when they had visualized an accepting
relationship, F(1, 67)  5.92, p  .02 (M  12.00 vs. M  10.78).
Action-oriented participants were not reliably affected in their endorse-
ments of negative traits by the visualization manipulation, F(1, 67)  1
(M  12.40 vs. M  12.05). The observed shift toward more negative
self-evaluations might reflect the tendency among state-oriented individu-
als to internalize the negative expectations of others (Kuhl & Kaze´n, 1994).
Table 3
Average Response Latencies for Detecting Happy Faces Among
Angry or Neutral Crowds (in Milliseconds) as a Function of
Visualization and AOD (Study 3)
AOD
Accepting visualization Demanding visualization
Angry
distractors
Neutral
distractors HAFPO
Angry
distractors
Neutral
distractors HAFPO
Action
M 1,533 1,108 425 1,422 1,203 220
SD 353 226 239 180 254 148
State
M 1,498 1,151 347 1,570 1,208 362
SD 225 276 247 202 144 187
Note. AOD  demand-related action orientation; HAFPO  happy
among angry faces pop-out (in milliseconds).
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Supplementary Analyses
AOD was weakly correlated with self-esteem, r(71)  .24, p 
.05, and uncorrelated with AOT (r  .12, ns). The analysis
revealed no effects of AOT and self-esteem that paralleled the
effects of AOD.
Discussion
As predicted, visualizing a demanding relationship caused
action-oriented individuals to become quicker in detecting happy
faces among angry crowds. No such effect was apparent among
state-oriented individuals. Presumably, visualizing a demanding
relationship led action-oriented participants to activate some of the
intuitive affect regulation skills that they had previously used in
coping with demanding interaction partners. Indeed, Study 3 ob-
served effects of AOD and no effects of AOT in response to the
demanding visualization. Because only AOD relates specifically to
people’s habitual manner of coping with demand, the unique
effects of AOD fit with the notion that the demanding visualization
triggered participants’ habitual styles of coping with demand.
Presumably, action-oriented individuals’ intuitive affect regulation
skills facilitated rapid and efficient switching from negative to
positive affect, thereby leading to quicker detection of happy faces
among angry crowds. As such, the results of Study 3 support the
notion that action-oriented individuals possess well-developed in-
tuitive affect regulation skills.
Alternatively, it could be argued that action-oriented partici-
pants consciously sought to improve their moods by diverting their
attention toward happy faces. However, if these participants had
really tried to do so, a more straightforward strategy would have
been to spend more time looking at the all-happy crowds. Our
results, however, found no evidence for such a pattern (see Foot-
note 6). Moreover, the detection of happy among angry faces was
not facilitated among state-oriented participants who had visual-
ized a demanding person. Past research has established that state-
oriented individuals are equally as motivated to experience posi-
tive affect as action-oriented participants (Brunstein & Olbrich,
1985; Kuhl, 1981). Accordingly, the lack of effects among state-
oriented participants fits with the notion that facilitation of detect-
ing happy faces in an angry crowd was mediated by intuitive
volitional mechanisms.
As predicted, the attention-grabbing effect of discrepant angry
faces (O¨ hman et al., 2001) was not moderated by action orienta-
tion. Consequently, priming a demanding context did not lead
action-oriented individuals to become less vigilant in detecting
negative affect. This finding is consistent with other research
showing that vigilance toward negative affect is functionally in-
dependent of intuitive affect regulation (Koole, 2003; Rosahl,
Tennigkeit, Kuhl, & Haschke, 1993). Moreover, this finding fur-
ther distinguishes intuitive affect regulation from repression,
which is associated with reduced vigilance toward negative affect
(Langens & Mo¨rth, 2002).
Finally, Study 3 found that visualizing a demanding relationship
caused action-oriented participants to become quicker in providing
self-evaluations. It is of particular interest that this self-activation
effect was found to mediate intuitive affect regulation among
action-oriented individuals in the face discrimination task. These
findings thus provide the first empirical evidence for the mediating
role of extension memory in intuitive affect regulation. It is im-
portant to note that our theoretical perspective does not hold that
there was something about the particular contents of action-
oriented participants’ self-evaluations that promoted intuitive af-
fect regulation. Indeed, the mediation effect of self-activation held
across both positive and negative traits and across both endorsed
and nonendorsed traits, suggesting that the contents of self-
evaluation mattered little in the effect. Rather, we suggest that
self-activation provides a marker of the involvement of extension
memory, the central executive system that drives intuitive affect
regulation. This line of reasoning is consistent with prior research,
which has interpreted response latencies on the me/not-me task as
indicative of access to clear and certain self-definitions (McGregor
& Marigold, 2003).
General Discussion
In the present research, we have suggested that action-oriented
individuals are capable of intuitive affect regulation, that is, a form
of top-down affect regulation in which high-level intuition (exten-
sion memory) modulates the person’s affective states so that they
become congruent with the person’s motives, contextual con-
straints, and goal intentions. To test this line of theorizing, we
conducted three studies that focused on the effects of demand-
Figure 2. Path analyses testing the mediating role of self-activation in the
effects of social demands on intuitive affect regulation (action-oriented
participants only; Study 3). The standardized beta value for the direct path
is given in parentheses. *p  .05 (one-tailed).
Table 4
Average Self-Evaluation Latencies (in Milliseconds) as a
Function of Demand Priming and AOD (Study 3)
AOD
Demand priming
Low High
Action
M 1,533 1,271
SD 415 257
State
M 1,356 1,405
SD 227 227
Note. AOD  demand-related action orientation.
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related action orientation (AOD) on intuitive affect regulation.
Across all three studies, we observed that the experimental induc-
tion of demands leads to down-regulation of negative affect among
action-oriented individuals, as evidenced in self-reported mood
changes (Study 1), in the affective Simon task (Study 2), and in a
face discrimination task (Study 3). None of these three studies
observed any parallel effects among state-oriented individuals.
Taken together, the present research found strong evidence that
action orientation is associated with powerful intuitive affect reg-
ulation skills.
The intuitive affect regulation skills of action-oriented individ-
uals display a distinctive functional profile. First, intuitive affect
regulation is highly sensitive to context, and only becomes trig-
gered when the situation is potentially stressful (Studies 1–3).
Second, intuitive affect regulation is efficient, given that it is
capable of moderating affective Simon effects (Study 2). Third,
intuitive affect regulation is nonrepressive, because it does not
interfere with automatic vigilance for negative affect (Study 3).
Fourth, intuitive affect regulation is accompanied by a highly
accessible self (Study 3). These four characteristics—context sen-
sitivity, efficiency, nonrepressiveness, and self-accessibility—ren-
der intuitive affect regulation a highly adaptive volitional tool.
Context sensitivity may help action-oriented individuals to shield
themselves against aversive affect only when this is required by
the current situation. Efficiency is useful when action-oriented
individuals must cope with rapidly unfolding, unexpected affect-
eliciting events under highly demanding circumstances. Nonre-
pressiveness allows action-oriented individuals to remain sensitive
toward potentially threatening events. Finally, self-accessibility
may allow action-oriented individuals to maintain self-integrity
under stressful circumstances (McGregor & Marigold, 2003).
In view of the considerable advantages of intuitive affect regu-
lation, one might wonder why state-oriented individuals are lack-
ing in these skills. One reason may be that some social environ-
ments are not conducive to the development of intuitive affect
regulation skills. The development of intuitive affect regulation
functions is inhibited by autonomy-undermining social interac-
tions (Kuhl, 2000). Conditions similar to those that were studied in
the present research (i.e., performance-contingent rewards, de-
manding relationship partners) are thus likely to foster state ori-
entation when these conditions become chronic aspects of people’s
lives. Past research has shown that autonomy-undermining expe-
riences are associated with reduced affective well-being (Reis,
Sheldon, Gable, Roscoe, & Ryan, 2000; Sheldon, Ryan, & Reis,
1996). From the present perspective, this association may arise
because autonomy-undermining experiences inhibit the develop-
ment of intuitive affect regulation skills and thus promote the
development of state orientation. Finally, it is important to keep in
mind that state-oriented individuals function quite adequately
when they are provided with a supportive emotional climate.
State-oriented individuals may thus remain relatively free from
functional impairments as long as they can manage to stay clear
from stressful situations (see Koole et al., in press).
Limitations and Future Perspectives
The present research is still preliminary and thus leaves a host of
questions open for further scrutiny. First, in the present research,
AOD and AOT emerged as relatively independent facets of action
orientation. AOD and AOT were not consistently correlated with
one another, and the effects of AOD were not obtained with AOT.
The present findings and conclusions thus do not generalize to all
types of action-oriented individuals. The specificity of the present
findings to AOD may be due to our focus on coping with demand,
which theoretically should evoke the AOD type of action orienta-
tion. Previous research indeed suggests that AOT is linked to
intuitive affect regulation in response to threat (Koole, 2004a,
2004b; Kuhl, 1981; Rholes et al., 1989). Future research should
thus explore the effects of action orientation under threatening
circumstances, which theoretically should invoke effects of AOT
on intuitive affect regulation. Second, the present research used
relatively mild stress inductions of a type presumably encountered
in many everyday situations. Past research has suggested that
action orientation also shields people against more extreme stres-
sors such as repeated failure (Brunstein & Olbrich, 1985; Kuhl,
1981), surgery (Kuhl, 1983), and exposure to phobic stimuli
(Schulte et al., 1997). Still, it is vital to conduct further research on
the role of intuitive affect regulation in coping with more severely
stressful situations.
Third, the present research only focused on down-regulation of
negative affect. Although this focus is consistent with the bulk of
prior affect regulation research, it is plausible that volitional affect
regulation processes will sometimes run counter to (immediate)
hedonistic concerns. For instance, Oettingen and Mayer (2002)
have shown that indulging in positive fantasies can undermine a
person’s goal strivings in the absence of a clear action plan. As
such, it seems likely that action-oriented individuals would eschew
this kind of positive rumination. Given the great theoretical interest
in volitional disengagement from positive affect, future research
should pay more attention to this issue.
Finally, the present research established the affect regulation
functions of action orientation independent of the effects of self-
esteem and chronic reappraisal or suppression tendencies. Docu-
menting the unique empirical contribution of action orientation is
important, because this highlights the explanatory value that is
gained by the construct. However, we do not mean to imply that
other individual differences have no effect on affect regulation.
Indeed, prior research has established the affect regulation func-
tions of individual differences such as self-esteem (e.g., Greenberg
et al., 1992) and chronic reappraisal and suppression (Gross &
John, 2003). A major challenge for future research lies in spelling
out the functional mechanisms that mediate these and related
individual differences in affect regulation.
Concluding Remarks
Volitional control over one’s own affective states is a remark-
able human achievement. Through this capacity, people can use
their feelings wisely and discriminately and thus avoid becoming
enslaved by their own passions (Goleman, 1995). On the basis of
the present research, it appears that people’s potential for volitional
affect regulation may be even greater than has been previously
assumed. Indeed, the present research found consistent evidence
that action-oriented individuals can down-regulate unwanted affect
in a highly efficient, nonrepressive, and flexible manner. As such,
action orientation represents a vital resource in getting a grip on
your feelings.
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989INTUITIVE AFFECT REGULATION
Appendix
Illustrative Items of the ACS-90 (Kuhl, 1994)
Demand-Related Action Orientation (AOD)
When I know I must finish something soon:
A. I have to push myself to get started
B. I find it easy to get it over and done with*
When I am getting ready to tackle a difficult problem
A. It feels like I am facing a big mountain I don’t think I can climb
B. I look for a way to approach the problem in a suitable manner*
When I have a boring assignment:
A. I usually don’t have a problem getting through it*
B. I sometimes just can’t get moving on it
Threat-Related Action Orientation (AOT)
When I have lost something that is very valuable to me and I can’t find
it anywhere:
A. I have a hard time concentrating on anything else
B. I put it out of my mind after a little while*
If I’ve worked for weeks on a project and then everything goes com-
pletely wrong with the project:
A. It takes me a long time to adjust myself to it.
B. It bothers me for a while, but then I don’t think about it
anymore*
When I am being told that my work is completely unsatisfactory:
A. I don’t let it bother me for too long*
B. I feel paralyzed
Note. Action-oriented responses are marked with an asterisk.
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